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Introduction and Background
Recent years have seen a substantial 
increase in concern about the condition 
of U.S. living marine resources, accom-
panied by a surge of litigation against 
NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS). Since the mid 1990’s, 
litigation against NMFS has risen tenfold, 
and the agency’s early record of success 
in defending its actions has dropped dra-
matically to below 50% (NAPA, 2002). 
Recreational and commercial fishermen 
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ABSTRACT—Recent years have seen 
a dramatic increase in litigation against 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, 
NOAA. Litigation may affect personnel 
throughout the agency, including scientists, 
whose work is often directly or indirectly 
influenced by complex legal requirements, 
but who may not be in a position to com-
ment or engage in public dialogue. It may 
be helpful for scientists and other agency 
personnel to join the ongoing discussion in 
the legal community regarding the interface 
of science and law. This paper provides a 
starting point with a selected introduction 
to relevant legal literature in this area. It 
uses the phrase “forensic fisheries science” 
to describe the application of science to 
legal requirements in the fishery manage-
ment context. It concludes with suggestions 
for future research that could assist NMFS 
scientists as they grapple with the chal-
lenge of using science to help the agency 
meet its complex legal requirements. 
 Forensic: belonging to, used in, or suit-
able to courts of judicature or to public 
discussion and debate; argumentative, 
rhetorical; relating to or dealing with the 
application of scientific knowledge to legal 
problems (Merriam-Webster Online Dic-
tionary, http://www.mw.com/home.htm).
once initiated more than half the cases, 
but environmental group filings have 
increased markedly in recent years. Liti-
gation by other plaintiffs, such as states, 
tribes, and nonfishing industrial groups, 
has increased as well (NAPA, 2002). 
Lawsuits brought under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1, the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) have 
increased markedly, along with a smaller 
increase in lawsuits brought under the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (MSFCMA). 
In response, NMFS has undertaken a 
series of initiatives designed to reduce 
litigation losses on process issues. For 
example, NMFS now employs regional 
NEPA coordinators who work to 1) 
ensure national and regional consistency, 
2) facilitate early, active participation of 
NMFS and the fishery management coun-
cils in the NEPA process, 3) coordinate 
NEPA training programs, and 4) provide 
advice on environmental compliance.2 It 
has also conducted a number of internal 
reviews, consultations, workshops, and 
strategy sessions aimed at improving 
its management and budget processes.3 
Nevertheless, given that “adversarial 
legalism”4 (Kagan, 2001) is the prevail-
ing paradigm for conflict resolution in 
the United States, we can expect that 
stakeholders will continue to use litiga-
tion as a blunt yet effective instrument 
for influencing the system.
Whether litigation is ultimately benefi-
cial to the fisheries management process 
is a matter of strongly diverging opinion 
(Panelists, 2001). On one hand, some 
1 See American Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 
(2000) (holding that environmental assessments 
on essential fish habitat amendments failed to 
include sufficient evidence or analysis to deter-
mine whether an environmental impact state-
ment should have been prepared); Greenpeace v. 
NMFS, 55 F.Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999) 
(holding that the supplemental EIS failed to thor-
oughly analyze cumulative effects of changes to 
FMP’s, requiring a programmatic EIS); Metcalf 
v. Daley, (2000) (finding inadequate NMFS’ 
FONSI/EA concluding that the Makah tribe’s 
whaling proposal would not significantly affect 
the environment). NEPA implementation has 
become such a problem that the Fishery Manage-
ment Council Chairs asked Congress to legisla-
tively exempt the fishery management process 
from NEPA. Under this proposal, NMFS and 
the Councils would still be required to engage in 
the NEPA planning process, but losing a NEPA 
challenge in court would result merely in judicial 
guidance rather than an injunction on the fishery. 
Testimony of David Benton, Senate Hearing, 9 
May 2002.
2 Testimony of William T. Hogarth, Senate Hear-
ings 2002. 
3 NMFS contracted with Ray Kammer to perform 
a major study of adequacy of funding, the abil-
ity of NMFS to comply with its mandates, and 
the impact of litigation on NMFS operations. 
This study is often informally referred to as “The 
Kammer Report.” 
4 “Adversarial legalism” refers both to the pre-
vailing American practice of resolving disputes 
through adversarial litigation-oriented processes, 
as well as the legal institutions and rules that 
facilitate and encourage it. 
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agency employees contend that excessive 
litigation inhibits effective management 
by diverting scarce resources, allowing 
scientifically inexpert judges to manage 
fisheries, polarizing participants, and 
hindering collaborative and innovative 
approaches. On the other hand, environ-
mental plaintiffs argue that lawsuits are 
the only way for them to gain a mean-
ingful voice in an industry-dominated 
fishery management council system and 
to ensure that NMFS complies with the 
law (Panelists, 2001). 
Although the agency’s attorneys 
manage the nuts and bolts of respond-
ing to these lawsuits, agency scientists 
and managers are also affected by this 
litigious climate.5 Environmental laws 
often mandate scientifically-based regu-
latory decisions, and thus play a major 
role in defining the agency’s research 
agenda. But although science is clearly 
a necessary component of the regulatory 
decision process, it is often not sufficient 
by itself. Environmental regulatory issues 
tend to be “trans-scientific” (Weinberg, 
1972): they raise questions that cannot 
be answered solely by recourse to sci-
ence, because of intractable scientific 
uncertainty and difficulties in translating 
legal requirements into concrete scientific 
standards. Agencies must address these 
mixed questions of science and law by 
relying on scientifically informed expert 
professional judgment in accordance 
with a reasonable interpretation of legal 
requirements (Jasanoff, 1990). In other 
words, agency scientists and managers 
must learn to work at the interface of 
science and law to assist in the produc-
tion of legally robust environmental 
documents. 
This paper uses the term “forensic 
fisheries management” to refer to issues 
at the boundary of law and science in 
the fisheries context.6 Although the 
term “forensic” conjures up images of 
5 Penny Dalton, former director of NMFS, testi-
fied that “Life at NMFS was a little like being 
on the F/V Andrea Gail in the “Perfect Storm”; 
you constantly felt that the next wave might well 
be the one that would capsize the boat.” Senate 
Hearing, 9 May 2002.
6 Thanks to Professor Marc Hershman, Univer-
sity of Washington, Seattle, for pointing out this 
underutilized definition of “forensic.” 
criminal investigations, the term has a 
much broader application. Forensic sci-
ence is simply the application of science 
to the law; “[t]he problems for the field 
have been set by the law’s demands for 
peculiar sorts of knowledge” (Mashaw, 
2003). Thus, the term “forensic fisheries 
science” refers specifically to the science 
questions that are asked and answered 
primarily for the purpose of meeting the 
agency’s legal requirements.
Agency scientists are tasked with 
addressing these forensic fishery sci-
ence questions by conducting research 
and providing data to develop man-
agement decisions that comply with 
legal mandates. Yet they labor with the 
uncomfortable knowledge that, in the 
event of a lawsuit, lawyers and judges 
will scrutinize their work for legal 
shortcomings. Legal requirements may 
seem especially arcane to scientists and 
managers, whose professional expertise 
lies in science rather than law. It would, 
of course, be both unreasonable and un-
necessary to expect scientists and manag-
ers to undertake rigorous legal training. 
However, it may be highly beneficial for 
them to join the ongoing conversation 
among the legal community on issues 
surrounding the application of science to 
the law. Such discussions could serve a 
boundary-spanning function by improv-
ing communications among scientists, 
managers, and legal counsel, thereby 
allowing agency personnel to work more 
effectively towards the common goal of 
producing legally compliant environmen-
tal documents. This paper seeks to serve 
as a starting point for such discussions 
with its selected review of recent legal 
literature containing useful theories and 
concepts regarding the intersection of 
law and science in the regulatory agency 
context. 
Literature Review
My initial literature search encom-
passed both legal and fishery science 
periodical databases. However, it quickly 
became apparent that articles containing 
the targeted subject matter appeared 
almost exclusively in the legal literature. 
In other words, it seems that lawyers 
are writing about scientists, but not vice 
versa. And because legal periodicals are 
rarely indexed on science-oriented data-
bases, it is unlikely that scientists would 
encounter such articles in their regular 
professional activities. The unique format 
of law review articles may pose an addi-
tional barrier to interdisciplinary learning. 
Law review articles are written with an 
audience of lawyers in mind. They tend to 
be extremely lengthy, heavily footnoted, 
and freighted with legal concepts and 
terminology. This is unfortunate, because 
the legal literature contains many instruc-
tive insights regarding the science-law 
interface. Accordingly, this review of the 
legal literature was written with regula-
tory scientists in mind. 
This paper does not attempt to describe 
the comprehensive realm of literature on 
the interface of science and law. Rather, 
it provides a selection of recent materi-
als, primarily from the legal and policy 
literature, chosen for their relevance and 
utility in helping scientists understand 
key issues and concepts in U.S. forensic 
fisheries management. Articles focus-
ing primarily on international fisheries 
issues7, fishery science, and tools for 
fishery management were excluded. In 
addition, the sizeable body of literature 
concerning the admissibility of scientific 
expert testimony at trial is only briefly 
discussed because it is rarely at issue 
in NMFS fishery cases.8 The selected 
literature is broadly organized under two 
related categories: 1) legal-institutional 
and 2) sociocultural, with subcategories 
under each. Because the issues are so 
tightly interwoven, these subcategories 
are not entirely discrete; however, the 
subcategories should assist the reader in 
parsing the literature. 
7 Carr and Scheiber (2002), for example, analyze 
initiatives to establish effective global conserva-
tion standards and institutions to govern marine 
fisheries and argue that the main problems are 
related to scientific uncertainty.
8 The landmark case on this issue is Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993). In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that trial courts must apply a two-part test 
in determining admissibility of scientific expert 
testimony: 1) whether the testimony reflects sci-
entific knowledge, derived from the scientific 
method, and amounting to good science; and 2) 
whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact 
to determine facts at issue in the case. A Westlaw 
search of NMFS cases decided after 1993 found 
only 3 cases mentioning Daubert, out of a total of 
283 cases involving NMFS. 
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Legal and Institutional Issues 
Governing the Integration 
Of Scientific Information in  
the Policymaking Process
Complex and Contradictory 
Statutory Mandates
Perhaps the most obvious and com-
monly cited problem is the difficulty 
of managing marine resources under 
multiple and sometimes contradictory 
statutory mandates (Heinz Center, 2000; 
Fletcher, 2002; Halpern, 2002; NAPA, 
2002; Pew Oceans Commission, 2003; 
Christie, 2004; U.S. Commission on 
Ocean Policy, 2004). The NMFS must 
simultaneously manage sustainable 
fisheries and conserve protected species 
under the statutory framework defined by 
the MSFCMA, ESA, NEPA, the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and 
other applicable laws. Each of these laws 
arose in response to different problems, 
and accordingly they have different statu-
tory mandates and different mechanisms 
for accomplishing their objectives. The 
twin goals of managing for sustainable 
fisheries and conserving protected spe-
cies are not mutually exclusive; however, 
unifying the current statutory framework 
could make the job easier.
Ecosystem-based management could 
serve as a useful organizing concept for 
statutory reform. The ESA and other 
resource management laws were not 
expressly designed with ecosystem man-
agement in mind, and these laws may 
not provide an adequate framework for 
taking into account all facts and values 
pertinent to solving broad complex re-
source management dilemmas (Flournoy, 
1994). Craig (2002) advocates expressly 
incorporating ecosystem management 
and restoration principles and to ac-
tively pursue restoration goals based on 
historical ocean productivity. But while 
NMFS is not expressly precluded from 
incorporating ecosystem management 
principles into the decision-making 
process, the lack of an express statutory 
mandate institutionalizing management 
at an ecosystem level means that such 
attempts will tend to remain fragmentary 
and procedural (Keiter, 1994). 
Macpherson (2001) argues that the 
1996 amendments to the MSFCMA 
and NMFS interpretive guidelines pro-
vide some statutory basis for managing 
fisheries using ecosystem principles by 
increasing information, facilitating con-
sideration of interrelated impacts, and 
improving managers’ ability to learn from 
experience. However, at this time there is 
no statutory mandate favoring ecosystem 
management over other approaches. 
The passage of the Oceans Act of 
2000, which established the U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy “to make 
recommendations for coordinated and 
comprehensive national ocean policy,” 
has renewed calls to overhaul and in-
tegrate the current fragmented marine 
resource management regime (Heinz 
Center, 2000; Fletcher, 2002; Halpern, 
2002; NAPA, 2002; Pew Oceans Com-
mission, 2003; Christie, 2004; U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy, 2004). Perhaps 
the recently released report from the U.S. 
Commission on Ocean Policy (2004) will 
spark a legislative response. 
The “Science Charade”
However helpful a well-integrated 
suite of ocean management laws might 
be, the integration of science, law, and 
policy in resource management will 
always present thorny challenges. One 
of the most important recurring ideas in 
the legal literature is the realization that 
complex environmental problems invari-
ably present mixed questions of science 
and policy, and that ignoring this fact 
presents regulatory pitfalls.
Using the example of toxic risk stan-
dard setting at the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), Wagner (1995, 1999) 
argues that agencies intentionally or un-
intentionally exaggerate the contributions 
made by science to avoid accountability 
for the underlying policy decisions—a 
phenomenon she calls “the science 
charade.” Toxic risk problems are trans-
scientific; because science cannot estab-
lish definitive quantitative standards for 
protecting human health from toxic risks, 
policy considerations must fill the gaps 
left by scientific uncertainty. There are 
powerful political, legal, and institutional 
incentives for agencies to conceal policy 
choices under a veneer of science. 
For example, the public insists on near 
absolute safety from toxic risk while 
also demanding a strong economy and 
reduced governmental regulations. This 
creates strong political pressure on agen-
cies to disguise the unavoidable policy 
choices as purely scientific. Individuals 
may also intentionally engage in the sci-
ence charade to retain personal control 
over the policy and research agenda. 
Congress also perpetuates the science 
charade by promulgating laws that put 
too much emphasis on scientific data in 
the mistaken belief that science alone can 
provide the solution to environmental 
problems. It is politically appealing to 
pass responsibility for making politi-
cally unpopular decisions to the agencies 
and to assume that “sound science” will 
resolve controversies in an objective 
manner. Scientific uncertainty allows 
legislators to impede environmental 
programs by insisting that more or better 
studies are needed. 
Wagner argues that the science charade 
creates substantial costs in the form of 
complicated and ineffective laws, delays 
in implementation, damage to democratic 
values, and demoralized agency person-
nel, and that regulatory reform efforts will 
not be successful unless they address it 
directly. Some options include: educat-
ing legislators and their staffs about the 
science charade; having Congress state 
policy choices explicitly in the text of 
legislation or requiring agencies to dis-
close their policy decisions; delegating 
toxic standard-setting to an administra-
tive task force composed of scientists 
and policymakers from academia, gov-
ernment, and stakeholders; or amending 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 
to require agencies to explicitly separate 
science from policy. 
The science charade and its conse-
quences can arguably be observed in any 
science-policy issue plagued with high 
levels of scientific uncertainty. Doremus 
(1997) examines the science charade 
in ESA implementation to explain why 
better science doesn’t always lead to 
better policy. The ESA requires that the 
threshold decision to add a species to the 
endangered or threatened list be made 
“solely on the basis of the best available 
scientific information.” But science alone 
cannot answer all the relevant questions, 
such as what risk of extinction society 
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should tolerate. Agencies are thus forced 
to pretend that their decisions were based 
solely on science without reference to 
policy judgments. Consequently, agen-
cies have an incentive to conceal the true 
bases for their decisions. Calls for “better 
science” only serve to reinforce the sci-
ence charade. Doremus (1997) concludes 
that ESA critics should focus on the 
process by which listing decisions are 
made and communicated to the public. 
Congress should separate the scientific 
aspects of listing determinations from 
the value judgments, either making 
those decisions itself or delegating them 
to agencies free of the “strictly science” 
mandate. Agencies should remain free 
to rely on the best available data, even if 
they are relatively weak. 
Halpern (2002) examined NMFS man-
agement of Steller sea lions, Eumetopias 
jubatus, as a case study regarding the 
effects of multi-statute administration 
on the role of science in environmental 
management. Halpern argues that NMFS 
does not consider each statutory mandate 
separately, but rather weighs them all 
together along with outside interests, 
economics, and science, in attempting 
reasonable management solutions (the 
“gestalt effect”). He further contends 
that NMFS uses science to define an ac-
ceptable range of management strategies 
(the “bookends effect”), but ultimately 
reacts to legal and political pressures in 
choosing a management strategy within 
that range (the “reactivity effect”).9 He 
argues that these effects demonstrate the 
subservience of scientific information to 
other considerations in administrative 
thinking, transforming NMFS from an 
objective expert to a political decision 
maker. Halpern does not place all the 
blame on NMFS for this state of affairs; 
he also questions the extent to which 
Congress should be able to shunt po-
litically difficult decisions to agencies. 
Interestingly, Halpern’s analysis bears a 
distinct resemblance to Wagner’s (1995) 
9 Halpern’s hypotheses regarding the “bookends” 
and “reactivity” effects seem to play down the 
inescapable nature of scientific uncertainty. In 
the face of high scientific uncertainty, decision 
makers cannot base their decisions solely on sci-
ence. Policy judgments are required to fill the gap 
between the “bookends.” 
science charade concept, although he 
never utilizes that term. 
Best Available  
Scientific Information
Innocuous though it may seem to 
the uninitiated, the notion of “sound 
science” has become a major battle cry 
among competing stakeholders. NMFS 
is often the target of lawsuits claiming 
that its management decisions were not 
based on the best available science. The 
MSFCMA, ESA, and MMPA mandate 
that agencies use the “best available 
science” in making certain management 
decisions, but because the term remains 
undefined, there is a great deal of un-
certainty as to its meaning and applica-
tion.10 The question of how to define and 
apply best available science in fisheries 
management is a classic example of 
the difficulties inherent in translating 
between legal and scientific evidentiary 
standards, burdens of proof, and treat-
ments of uncertainty.
Invoking the mantra of “sound sci-
ence” is politically appealing because 
of the common perception that science 
is objective and infallible (Coglianese 
and Marchant, 2004). Some stakeholder 
groups have been pressing Congress to 
legislate a rigid definition of the term, 
arguing that implementation will be 
improved if agency actions are based 
on strict research methodology and 
peer-reviewed empirical evidence. But 
many scientists and managers contend 
that this is a thinly veiled attempt by 
special interests to paralyze decision 
making and delay protective actions 
by ruling out the only available data 
(Mooney, 2004). 
Wagner (2003) argues that so-called 
“good science” reforms, which are 
designed to rectify purported problems 
with the quality of agency science, miss 
the mark and may actually damage 
administrative processes. She contends 
that the real problem is not with the 
10 See http://www.usm.maine.edu/~rieser/work 
shop%20goals. References to “best available sci-
ence” can be found in the following statutes: 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1533(b), 1536(c), 1537a(c) (1994); 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1851(a) and 1881d (1997); 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1362(19) and (27), 1371(a), 1373(a), 1374, 
1378, 1383b(a), 1386(a) and (b) (1994). 
quality of agency science, but rather 
the quantity of science needed to justify 
regulation. Rather than fixating on peer 
review, reform efforts should focus on 
overcoming what she calls “the rebuttal 
problem”—deciding when the cumula-
tive weight of the evidence is enough 
to first justify, then rebut, a protective 
policy. Clarifying these rebuttal crite-
ria, she says, will improve regulatory 
outcomes by enhancing transparency of 
agency decisions, properly isolating the 
underlying issues for judicial review, 
and focusing decision-making criteria 
on statutory goals. 
Courts continue to struggle with best 
available science issues. Brennan et 
al. (2003) explored the role played by 
scientific uncertainty in implementing 
the ESA, focusing on judicial efforts to 
apply the best available science standard 
in ESA cases, and recent legislative at-
tempts to modify the standard. Agencies 
and courts are plagued by the ESA’s 
lack of definitional terms and the fact 
that endangered species data are often 
vague, ambiguous, and uncertain. As a 
result, judicial guidance has been equally 
inconsistent and ambiguous; too often 
the court either disregards the legislative 
best available science requirement, or 
intrudes too far into the agency decision-
making process. The authors suggest that 
courts take a “hard look” to determine 
whether the agency considered the scien-
tific information available to it, identified 
the information used in its decision, and 
clearly explained its determination.
Doremus (2004) offers an in-depth 
review of the purposes and effects of the 
ESA’s best available science mandate. 
She argues that Congress included the 
best available science mandate in an 
attempt to ensure that trained experts 
would make strictly technical decisions 
in an objective, value-free manner. In 
practice, however, science alone cannot 
fully answer all ESA decisions. Ques-
tions such as how to define the problem 
or how much risk of extinction society 
should tolerate are inescapably political 
in nature. 
Doremus (2004) contends that the 
ESA’s best available science mandate 
does not play a major role in constraining 
agency decision making because it adds 
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little beyond the general requirement to 
avoid being “arbitrary and capricious” by 
showing a rational connection between 
the decision and the available informa-
tion. She argues that the primary effect 
of the mandate is in limiting the agency’s 
ability to openly rely on nonscientific fac-
tors in the decision process, rather than 
exerting a major substantive effect on 
the substantive treatment of science. The 
ESA is not broken; however, agencies 
could improve their use of science in the 
ESA context by 1) openly acknowledg-
ing the limits of science, including the 
scope of scientific uncertainty and the 
nonscientific aspects of decisions, 2) 
actively seeking ways to obtain new sci-
entific information and put it to use, and 
3) building public trust and acceptance of 
ESA decisions by overcoming “project-
specific myopia.” This could be accom-
plished by separating the scientific aspect 
of decisions from the political aspect, and 
explaining the role of uncertainty. 
In 2001, a prominent group of scien-
tists and lawyers convened a workshop to 
examine recent litigation and associated 
agency actions regarding application of 
the best available science standard.11 Key 
themes included how to reconcile law and 
science for protection of biodiversity; the 
nature and sources of scientific informa-
tion available to agencies; the processes 
by which agencies determine best avail-
able science; the treatment of uncertainty 
in these processes; and the interpretation 
of scientific theories and data in litiga-
tion. Rather than coming to an agreed 
set of conclusions, the workshop served 
as an important forum for lawyers and 
scientists to exchange their perspectives 
and to brainstorm ideas. 
Three years later, the NRC Ocean 
Studies Board conducted a study on 
“Defining Best Scientific Information 
Available in Fishery Management” 
(NRC, 2004) .The study brought together 
scientists, policymakers, and legal ex-
perts with the stated goal of “produc[ing] 
recommendations for more uniform 
application of best available scientific 
information in preparation of fishery 
11 Available at http://www.usm.maine.edu/
~rieser/workshop.html (accessed 16 January 
2004). 
management plans.” 12 The NRC commit-
tee found that the best available science 
standard in the MSFCMA “embodies 
the idea that decisions…should be made 
in a timely and effective fashion with 
available information despite recognized 
data gaps” but that there are no uniform 
guidelines for applying the standard. 
The committee also found institutional 
and regional differences in the way the 
standard is applied. But the committee 
did not advise amending the MSFCMA 
to include a statutory definition of best 
available science because it could impede 
the incorporation of new scientific infor-
mation and would be difficult to amend 
if more flexibility was needed. Instead, 
the committee advised that the NMFS 
establish regional guidelines to govern 
the production and use of best avail-
able science in fisheries management. 
This would enhance accountability and 
credibility while allowing for flexibility 
when warranted under the circumstances 
(NRC, 2004). 
Scientific Uncertainty and the 
Politicization of Science
Policymakers increasingly rely on sci-
entists to provide scientific predictions as 
a guide to decision making (Sarewitz et 
al., 2000). Science’s apparent predictive 
capacity seems to promise an objective 
basis for difficult decisions. But the 
appeal of scientific prediction is based 
in part on confusion about the nature of 
prediction for policy making. Prediction 
in science has been traditionally used to 
validate reductionist theory, yet predic-
tion for policy making is quite different. 
It has political elements because it offers 
to reduce the contentious, subjective ele-
ments of the decision process. The ability 
of predictive research to improve policy 
outcomes may depend on a variety of 
social, economic, and political factors, 
as well as scientific uncertainty (Sarewitz 
et al., 2000).
Paradoxically, in the context of science 
intensive resource management disputes, 
science may feed political controversy 
rather than foster consensus (Sarewitz, 
1996). Sarewitz (2004) argues that “sci-
12 See http://nationalacademies.org/osb/ (accessed 
6 February 2004). 
entific inquiry is inherently and unavoid-
ably subject to becoming politicized in 
environmental controversies.” This is 
because 1) science provides stakeholders 
with different sets of legitimated facts 
about nature which can be used to support 
desired policy outcomes, 2) competing 
disciplinary approaches to understanding 
the science basis of environmental prob-
lems may be tied to competing ethical po-
sitions, and 3) scientific uncertainty can 
be viewed as “a lack of coherence among 
competing scientific understandings” 
rather than a mere dearth of knowledge. 
Scientific disunity and political conflict 
combine to create conditions of scientific 
uncertainty. 
The typical response is to call for more 
research, but new data often increases 
uncertainty or provides more “ammuni-
tion” to fuel the ongoing political conflict 
(Pielke, 2004). Additional scientific data 
can result in what Sarewitz (2004) terms 
an “excess of objectivity,” in which com-
peting stakeholders pick and choose the 
data that support their preferred value-
based policy outcomes. This is the phe-
nomenon underlying the common refrain 
that “our science is sound science and 
their science is junk science” (McGarity, 
2004). Scientists themselves may also 
politicize science by using it to negotiate 
for specific desired political outcomes 
(Pielke, 2004). Sarewitz (2004) contends 
that progress in addressing environmental 
controversies is unlikely to occur without 
advances in political process. 
Heazle (2004) examines the treatment 
of scientific uncertainty at the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC) to 
show how scientific uncertainty can be 
interpreted and manipulated in relation 
to its perceived political utility. Scientific 
uncertainty was once used to argue against 
lower whaling quotas on the grounds that 
there was no proof that increased whaling 
would harm stocks. But today, anti-whal-
ing nations use scientific uncertainty to 
support the current whaling moratorium. 
More scientific information has failed 
to force consensus on the underlying 
value-based disagreements between 
whaling and nonwhaling nations. Heazle 
(2004) argues that the likelihood of an 
individual to oppose a given action or 
policy by invoking scientific uncertainty 
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is dependent upon the extent to which the 
action may satisfy a recognized need and 
the extent to which it is perceived not to 
conflict with an already established need. 
Scientific uncertainty can be quite useful 
when used to invoke the precautionary 
principle (regulate absent proof of safety) 
or its polar opposite (do not regulate 
absent proof of harm). Thus, “it is not 
uncertainty itself that determines or influ-
ences policy making so much as how we 
choose to use it” (Heazle, 2004).
The Influence of Institutional 
Structures and Functions on the  
Environmental Decision-making 
Process
Even the best scientific information 
will be of little use unless it is success-
fully integrated into the decision-making 
process. The success or failure of this 
integrative process is highly dependent 
on the institutions that bring together sci-
entists and policymakers. Commentary 
in this area focuses on decision-making 
structures and functions: how they shape 
the issues and the research agenda; how 
they legitimate data; and how they me-
diate between the competing forces of 
technocracy (science) and democracy 
(public participation). 
Institutions can play a powerful role in 
mediating the impact of scientific assess-
ments on environmental policy. Cash et 
al. (2003) found that the most influential 
assessments are simultaneously per-
ceived by a broad array of actors to pos-
sess three attributes: saliency (whether 
an actor perceives the assessment to be 
addressing relevant issues), credibility 
(whether an actor perceives the assess-
ment’s arguments to meet standards of 
scientific plausibility and accuracy), and 
legitimacy (whether an actor perceives 
the assessment as unbiased). Efforts to 
bolster one of these attributes usually 
come at the expense of another. 
Institutions shape the influence of 
assessments largely by balancing the 
tradeoffs between saliency, credibility, 
and legitimacy. Important factors include 
1) the embeddedness of an assessment 
(the degree to which it is carried out 
within or under the control of the orga-
nization that will subsequently use it), 
2) the weakness or strength of boundary 
spanning arrangements (bridging the gap 
between experts doing the assessment 
and the decision makers who use it), and 
3) provisions for learning and critical 
self-reflection (to balance the benefits of 
cumulative experience with the need to 
track changing conditions). Information 
alters behavior not by directly altering 
deep-seated values and goals, but by 
indirectly altering the beliefs actors have 
about what their interests are and the best 
ways to pursue them.
Flournoy (1991) argues that the tra-
ditional decision-making structure em-
bodied in many environmental protection 
statutes, such as the ESA, fails to provide 
an effective mechanism for resolving 
factual disputes in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. This process is based on a 
“binary structure” that requires decision 
makers to resolve a single issue with a 
yes or no answer. The burden of meet-
ing the standard of proof is allocated to 
a given party, typically the proponent 
of regulatory action. Because scien-
tific uncertainty cannot be completely 
eliminated, a process that predicates 
regulation on affirmative proof of harm 
tends to amplify the burden of proof and 
discourage protective regulation. And 
because the binary system tends to sort 
facts based on their ability to pass the 
certainty threshold, it tends to encourage 
the parties to mask the uncertainty and 
value judgments which are bound up in 
their conclusions. 
Fluornoy (1991) suggests that Con-
gress increase uniformity and clarity in 
statutory provisions; clarifying funda-
mental policy choices; explicitly allocate 
burdens of proof; require agencies to 
assess the adequacy of the record before 
making decisions; and develop a deci-
sion-making process that permits more 
than two possible outcomes and provides 
agencies with a range of responses based 
on a sliding scale of standards of proof. 
Why do Federal scientific advisory 
committees often fail to produce consen-
sus or reduce conflict, even though they 
are composed of supposedly rational, 
independent experts? In a pathbreaking 
book, Jasanoff (1990) examines this 
question using case studies of decision 
making at the EPA and the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and grounds 
her analysis in a framework drawn from 
extensive theoretical and empirical 
research on the relationship between 
science and the regulatory process. She 
challenges two commonly accepted as-
sumptions regarding the use of science 
by regulatory agencies: the technocratic 
view that policy choices can be validated 
by independent experts relying on sound 
science, and the democratic view that 
broad public participation is the antidote 
to abuses of expert authority. 
Noting that regulatory science ques-
tions are inherently mixed with policy 
and unavoidably entail a high level of 
scientific uncertainty, she questions the 
ability of scientists to remain neutral 
while certifying results as valid. She also 
argues against the strict separation of sci-
ence and politics on the grounds that it is 
impossible to restrict the science advisory 
process to purely technical issues. 
Courts, too, play a significant role 
in the way that scientific information 
is defined, legitimated, and applied in 
the policy process. Some argue that 
scientifically illiterate judges exacerbate 
agencies’ litigation woes, but Jasanoff 
(1982) argues that proposals for judicial 
reform aimed at enhancing the technical 
competence of courts fall short because 
these problems are not solely attribut-
able to a lack of judicial competence. 
Scientific uncertainty is inescapable and 
policy problems often arrive at the court 
disguised as purely scientific questions, 
which cannot be resolved by technical 
debates.
Some commentators, including former 
EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus, 
argue that fundamental tensions between 
science and democracy pose a major 
obstacle to science-policy integration.13 
Policymakers ask scientists to resolve 
complex regulatory problems, but science 
is not a democratic institution. Policy-
makers may use science as a “fig leaf” 
to legitimize a political decision, and 
scientists may also dabble in policymak-
ing—the “mutual corruption of science 
and policymaking.” The result is that 
13 Ruckleshaus, W. “Science and Public Policy: 
The Twain Must Meet”, Transcript of the Wolfle 
Lecture at the University of Washington, 16 May 
2002.
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science is delegitimized in the public eye, 
and policymaking is paralyzed. 
Ruckelshaus argues that we lack 
institutions where democratic powers 
can be exercised in concert with the ap-
plication of the best science, and suggests 
“resolution by collaboration,” whereby 
interest groups and government agencies 
at all levels with a stake in some local 
issue come together to solve problems 
that no single one of them could solve 
alone. Rather than trying to completely 
separate science and management, we 
need constant feedback between the two. 
The science effort must focus closely on 
the specific needs of managers, and the 
managers must absorb new information 
and learn to ask intelligent questions that 
science can actually try to answer.
Similarly, Karkkainen (2002a) dis-
cusses a new model of collaborative 
ecosystem governance that recognizes 
the need for integrated ecosystem man-
agement emphasizing regional solutions 
within broader structures of coordination 
and accountability, and allows for con-
tinuous experimentation and adjustment. 
These challenges are addressed through 
public-private governance structures 
which emphasize information sharing, 
monitoring, and collaborative problem 
solving among diverse interests on mul-
tiple spatial scales. 
But Karkkainen (2002a) sees poten-
tial pitfalls in the lack of fit between 
collaborative ecosystem governance 
institutions and conventional governance 
structures; law prefers tidy, permanent 
rules, whereas ecosystem management is 
“messy, elaborate, cumbersome, ad hoc, 
and defiantly unconventional.”
Adler (2002) advocates the use of a 
consensus-building strategy known as 
environmental conflict resolution (ECR), 
which uses strategic cooperation in an 
attempt to address science-intensive re-
source management challenges by seek-
ing solutions that maximize mutual gains. 
Based on extensive interviews, focus 
groups, and case studies, Adler offers five 
intriguing hypotheses for determining 
conditions likely to enhance the success 
of ECR. ECR is more likely to succeed 
if: 1) political issues are discussed before 
technical issues, 2) scientific aspects of 
a decision are explicitly examined by 
all parties, 3) scientific uncertainties are 
openly acknowledged, 4) participants 
work together on scientific modeling, and 
5) participants confront their own inher-
ent assumptions and biases, and acknowl-
edge the validity of other participants’ 
perspectives. In ECR, the thorny question 
of “how much science is enough” must 
be negotiated. Thus, one test of ECR is 
whether it can successfully facilitate the 
integration of the best science with the 
best of what the politics and policies of 
a given conflict can allow.
Tarlock (2002) argues that the failure 
of science to satisfactorily answer envi-
ronmental questions posed by society 
has led to the contested “ownership” 
of science. Scientists once owned sci-
ence in the sense that they controlled 
both the production and use of scientific 
knowledge. But when scientists could 
not provide all the answers that society 
posed, nonscientists asserted a right to 
participate in the application of science 
to public policy choices. 
Although scientists are the primary 
“owners” of science, they cannot exclu-
sively control it because the issues are 
framed by legislators and regulators, 
forcing the scientific community to adapt 
its protocols of inference and standards 
of proof to answer them. Tarlock (2002) 
suggests several approaches for bridging 
this gap: 1) reject the false dichotomy 
between “sound” and “junk” science in 
favor of a credible scientific foundation; 
2) utilize the precautionary principle as 
a basis for legitimate decisions, provided 
that a reasonable evidentiary threshold 
for invoking it has been established, 
mid-course correction mechanisms are 
created, and the needs of adversely af-
fected parties have been considered; 3) 
create open-ended decision processes 
that allow for progressive stages of deci-
sion making as knowledge is acquired; 
and 4) the scientific community must 
accept the need to redirect research to 
questions deemed relevant by society; 
in other words, “scientists must learn to 
think like lawyers.” (It would also seem 
prudent for lawyers to learn to think like 
scientists!)
Noting that scientists have become 
more actively engaged in the policymak-
ing process, Clark et al. (1998) discuss 
how Canada, the United States, and 
Mexico approach science-policy integra-
tion. Although the countries’ approaches 
often differ in their specifics, common 
prerequisites to successful science-policy 
integration include clarity of objectives, 
clarity of roles and responsibilities, 
quality control through peer review, and 
effective stakeholder involvement. They 
emphasize that political and legal issues 
cannot be solved by more or better sci-
ence, and caution against a “tyranny of 
small decisions,” whereby manageable 
issues are not dealt with until they create 
a major crisis. 
Integrating New Scientific  
Thinking Into the  
Existing Legal Structure
When well-meaning scientists and 
managers attempt to introduce innovative 
strategies such as ecosystem manage-
ment and adaptive management into the 
decision-making process, they may be 
shocked and dismayed at the legal and 
institutional roadblocks they encounter. 
Many environmental laws were passed 
decades ago, during a time when our 
understanding of the environment was 
based upon outdated notions of equilib-
rium and the balance of nature (Tarlock, 
1994, 2003; Scheiber, 1997; Bossel-
man, 2002). Ecologists once assumed 
that ecological systems were relatively 
uniform, closed, and self-sufficient, but 
they now see ecosystems as open and 
susceptible to outside influences. This 
shift has created a disconnect between 
new ecological theories and environ-
mental laws based on the old theories 
(Tarlock, 1994). The nonequilibrium 
paradigm’s emphasis on constant flux 
and change has exacerbated the problem 
of environmental decision making under 
high scientific uncertainty because it 
heightens the tension between traditional 
strict standards of legal causation and 
the limits of science’s ability to provide 
definite answers (Tarlock, 1994). 
Sustainable management of living 
marine resources requires development 
of management institutions, such as 
adaptive management, that will effec-
tively produce, identify, and integrate 
new scientific knowledge into natural 
resource decisions (Tarlock, 1994; 
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Doremus, 2001). Adaptive management 
remains influential as an idea, but it has 
thus far had limited success as a practi-
cal conservation method (Lee, 1999). It 
challenges the legal system’s efforts to 
promote settled expectations and finality 
of decisions. It requires flexibility, yet 
legal and political institutions seek long-
term certainty. The flexibility demanded 
by adaptive management leaves decisions 
open to political pressure. Agencies 
may seek out any discretion they can 
find in the ESA and use it to reduce the 
protection of biological resources under 
political pressure (Doremus, 2001). 
Adaptive management has been called 
“an elaborate accomodationist and incre-
mentalist tactic for reducing the visibility 
and consequent political vulnerability 
of management innovation” (Scheiber, 
1997). And although adaptive manage-
ment could be a useful tool for structuring 
the dialogue between policy and science, 
there has been little willingness or ability 
to use large-scale ecosystem experiments 
to probe scientific uncertainties (Volk-
man, 1999). Endangered species listings 
may offer incentives to learn through 
adaptive management, but they also 
create opportunities for stakeholders 
to perpetuate their defensive positions 
(Volkman, 1993). 
Despite these challenges, there may be 
ways to make adaptive management more 
feasible and acceptable to stakeholders. 
Lee (1999) suggests that adaptive man-
agement may be more successful if a 
collaborative structure is in place before 
adaptive management approaches are 
implemented, rather than the common 
approach of adopting experimentation 
during the planning process. Otherwise, 
adaptive management can become “a 
way to justify trial and error in the midst 
of a political free-for-all” (Lee, 1999). 
Ecosystem management and ecosys-
tem revival efforts face similar road-
blocks, as they are a radical departure 
from environmental laws favoring quick 
technological fixes rather than sustained 
management of functioning ecosystems. 
And extensive stakeholder participation 
favored in laws such as NEPA may not be 
compatible with ecosystem experiments 
that are fundamentally informed by sci-
ence (Tarlock, 2003). 
Doremus (2001) argues that if adaptive 
management is to work, we must develop 
institutions capable of permitting flex-
ibility while strengthening the agency’s 
resolve in the face of strong political 
pressure. Tarlock (1994) suggests that 
the legal system can balance individual 
fairness with environmental protection 
by applying concepts that provide for 
the continuous integration of science and 
policymaking. This would include reduc-
ing data gaps and paying close attention 
to implementation and monitoring so that 
policies can be continually modified as 
necessary. He favors science-based deci-
sion making with public accountability 
as a checking mechanism and concludes 
that environmental laws must be revised 
to provide new statutory foundations 
for ecosystem revival (Tarlock, 2003). 
Bosselman (2002) suggests strategies 
for better incorporating ecological data 
into management processes, such as 
facilitating access to large-scale ecologi-
cal information; developing performance 
standards for alteration of ecological 
processes; and requiring large-scale envi-
ronmental impact analyses. Governments 
must proactively think in advance about 
how they will react to likely ecological 
disturbances and work to counteract 
or avoid unidirectional environmental 
change. 
Legal reforms may be necessary to 
address these problems. Keiter (1994) 
examines the ecosystem management 
concept from a legal perspective, docu-
menting its fragmentary emergence into 
the common law via piecemeal judicial 
rulings and administrative initiatives. 
He identifies legal barriers to ecosys-
tem management, including statutory 
mandates favoring resource production, 
court cases favoring property owners 
who argue that burdensome regulations 
entitle them to just compensation (the 
“takings” doctrine), and decisions hostile 
to citizens’ right to sue (the “standing” 
doctrine). He also points to bureau-
cratic resistance to change; the political 
pitfall of local opposition to ecosystem 
management; and the difficulties of in-
tegrating science and policy. He argues 
that Congress should enact statutory 
reforms to institutionalize ecosystem 
management. 
The Double-edged Sword  
of NEPA: Planning Tool  
and Source of Litigation
Although NEPA compliance can 
sometimes seem to be a costly and 
burdensome procedural task, there is an 
increasing recognition that NEPA can 
serve as a strategic planning tool and as 
a “framework for collaboration between 
federal agencies and those who will bear 
the environmental, social, and economic 
impacts of their decisions” (CEQ, 1997). 
Since the enactment of NEPA, several 
other laws have been passed that echo 
NEPA’s requirements for environmental 
analyses, consultation, and documenta-
tion. NEPA can serve as an organizing 
tool by 1) using scoping and tiering 
to prevent duplication of analyses, 2) 
preparing environmental studies under 
NEPA and other laws concurrently, 3) 
combining documents under NEPA and 
other laws, and 4) combining public 
participation under NEPA and other laws 
(CEQ, 1997). 
NEPA can serve as a tool for integrat-
ing ecosystem management principles 
into agency decision making via the 
cumulative impacts analysis. Cumulative 
impacts analysis is particularly challeng-
ing because of the difficulty in defining 
geographical and temporal boundaries. 
If the boundaries are set too narrowly, 
significant issues may be missed, but 
if set too broadly, the analysis becomes 
overwhelming. However, “an ecosystem 
approach to strategic planning through 
NEPA can provide a framework for 
evaluating the environmental status quo 
and the combined cumulative impacts of 
individual projects, thereby enhancing 
the attainment of environmental quality 
objectives on a broader, more cost-effec-
tive scale” (CEQ, 1997).14 
There is also increasing interest in 
using NEPA as a tool for adaptive man-
agement. Typically, the NEPA process 
ends when an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) is released, in which case 
14 For a discussion of analytical tools for cumula-
tive impact analysis, see Larry Canter, “Cumu-
lative Effects and Other Analytical Challenges 
of NEPA” in Clark and Canter, “Environmental 
Policy and NEPA: Past, Present and Future” 
(1997). 
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adequate environmental protection de-
pends partially on the accuracy of the pre-
dicted impacts and expected mitigation 
results.15 Adaptive management allows 
agencies to analyze and approve a plan 
with an uncertain outcome, monitoring 
the status of the resource to make correc-
tive changes to the project or mitigation 
plan if necessary (CEQ, 1997).16 
Caldwell (1998) champions the origi-
nal intent and unrealized potential of 
NEPA as an “umbrella policy that inte-
grates purposes and objectives and pro-
vides for choice where agency missions 
and environmental quality may conflict.” 
This approach may be especially helpful 
for NMFS, which is confronted with the 
dilemma of carrying out the primary 
objective of fisheries management while 
accommodating a host of other environ-
mental statutory mandates. 
Caldwell (1998) believes NEPA has 
had a positive impact on government 
policies, but maintains that agencies 
have not fully internalized the substan-
tive goals of NEPA due to “bureaucratic 
and judicial conservatism and equivocal 
political support.” He favors legal reform 
to reinvigorate NEPA’s substantive man-
date, as well as a constitutional amend-
ment for the environment.
Karkkainen (2002b) argues that NEPA 
is often criticized as weak, procedural, 
and costly because its “ex ante predic-
tions are inevitably inexact and contest-
able.” He argues that agencies try to pro-
tect themselves against legal challenges 
to the adequacy of EIS’s by producing 
large yet uninformative documents. 
They may also seek to avoid the EIS 
process by making a finding of no sig-
nificant impact (FONSI) and relying on 
mitigation measures to reduce expected 
impacts below threshold levels (mitigated 
FONSI). However, because NEPA does 
not require follow-up monitoring, actual 
impacts remain unknown. Karkkainen 
(2002b) recommends retooling NEPA 
15 Of course, the degree of environmental protec-
tion will be largely dependent upon the agency’s 
final choice of alternatives. Agencies may choose 
the environmentally preferable alternative, but 
are not required to do so (Bass et al., 2001).
16 See also R. A. Carpenter, “The Case for Con-
tinuous Monitoring and Adaptive Management 
under NEPA,” in Clark and Canter (1997). 
by requiring follow-up monitoring, 
adaptive mitigation, and implementing 
an environmental management-systems 
approach. 
The programmatic EIS can be a useful 
planning tool, but a recent NEPA Task 
Force report on “modernizing NEPA 
implementation” (CEQ, 2003) suggests 
that the Preliminary Environmental 
Impact Statement (PEIS) process is not 
always meeting agency and stakeholder 
needs. Ideally, the PEIS improves agency 
decision making by forcing a “system-
atic and comprehensive consideration of 
environmental matters early in the plan-
ning stage” (Cooper, 1993). However, 
NEPA task force study participants cited 
challenges in determining how to define 
the proper scope and depth of program-
matic analysis; how to use it effectively; 
how to determine the “shelf life” of the 
document; and how to integrate adaptive 
management principles. The process can 
become particularly contentious when 
stakeholders ask for greater specific-
ity in the PEIS than agencies believe is 
required. 
While agencies can always improve 
their NEPA implementation processes, 
some guidance from CEQ might be 
very helpful in this area. An illustrative 
example can be found in Greenpeace v. 
NMFS, 55 F.Supp.2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 
1999). In that case, the presiding Judge 
Thomas Zilly held that the supplemental 
EIS for the North Pacific groundfish FMP 
(NMFS, 1998) was inadequate because 
it only addressed impacts related to total 
allowable catch (TAC) determination. 
The court remanded the Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) 
to the agency and ordered it to prepare 
a “programmatic EIS analyzing the 
impacts of the FMP’s as a whole on the 
North Pacific ecosystem.” 
Preparing a programmatic supple-
mental EIS on this scale has proven 
to be an extremely challenging task. 
There are also nagging questions about 
the proper scope and content of the 
alternatives, with the environmental 
community demanding a high level of 
action-forcing detail and NMFS opting 
for a broad comparison of management 
frameworks. The resulting document 
(NMFS, 2004) is approximately 6,000 
pages in length and took five years to 
prepare. It seems reasonable to ask 
whether more guidance from CEQ could 
reduce legal uncertainties regarding 
scope and content of a PEIS and thereby 
improve efficiency. 
NMFS can also learn from the ex-
perience of agencies such as the U.S. 
Forest Service, which endured a similar 
litigation crisis a decade ago, related to 
conflicts over the recovery of the northern 
spotted owl and the potential impact of 
logging old growth forests. Ackerman 
(1990) describes the “co-evolution” of 
NEPA and the Forest Service over the 
first 20 years of NEPA implementation, 
asserting that the Forest Service has 
integrated NEPA into its basic decision-
making process but cautioning that the 
high complexity, cost, time constraints, 
and public debate regarding Forest Ser-
vice decisions warrant changes in the way 
those decisions are made. 
Many of the Ackerman (1990) obser-
vations are relevant to NMFS. For ex-
ample, he asserts that NEPA’s procedures 
are “better suited to discrete projects 
than to the continuous and dynamic land 
management programs implemented by 
the Forest Service.” Whereas failure to 
act on a proposed project merely pre-
serves the status quo, failure to act on 
a new land management policy serves 
to perpetuate past practices, which may 
be harmful. Furthermore, the multiple 
layers of required analyses require huge 
amounts of time, money, and manpower, 
yet they are never finished and must be 
continually updated. And because of the 
political nature of complex resource al-
location decisions, the final decision is 
never permanent or easily defensible. 
Ackerman (1990) questions whether 
NEPA can be efficiently and effectively 
applied to broad, complex, dynamic, and 
ongoing programs, and suggests that 
Congress should provide clearer policy 
guidance. 
Mattix and Becker (2002) review 
issues of scientific uncertainty under 
NEPA. Since 1986, CEQ regulations 
have required agencies to obtain in-
complete and unavailable information 
in an EIS when it would not be exorbi-
tantly expensive, and it would be relevant 
to reasonably foreseeable significant 
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adverse impacts. However, NEPA regu-
lations do not specify when and under 
what conditions scientific uncertainty 
mandates preparing an EIS rather than an 
Environmental Assessment (EA). These 
issues are intensified when stakeholders 
point to scientific information that seems 
to conflict with the agency’s science. 
Mattix and Becker (2002) observe that 
court decisions are inconsistent on this 
issue, and suggest that regulatory guid-
ance from CEQ is needed. 
Sociocultural Issues
Ultimately, successful fishery man-
agement relies on effectively changing 
human behavior. This includes the 
people managing the resource as well as 
those harvesting it. Therefore, it may be 
useful to examine the agency decision-
making process in light of nonscientific 
social and cultural factors. The literature 
summarized in the following section 
highlights misunderstandings that arise 
from different goals, incentive structures, 
and ways of legitimizing knowledge. 
This body of literature is particularly 
helpful in understanding why within 
the same agency different people, such 
as scientists and lawyers, may have 
radically different interpretations of the 
same situation, and what might be done 
to improve communications. 
Science and Law: 
The Culture Clash
Science, law, and politics represent 
radically different modes of legitimating 
public decisions. Schuck (1993) argues 
that the science-law-politics conflict is 
fundamentally cultural. It lies near the 
center of important public debates, even 
when it goes unrecognized. Schuck 
(1993) analyzes the cultures of science, 
law, and politics by examining the central 
values to which members of the culture 
subscribe, the incentive structures that 
motivate the culture’s members and the 
decision techniques they employ, and the 
characteristic biases and orientations of 
the culture. 
Science Scientific facts are con-
structed and validated through a social 
process dominated by those in the scien-
tific community with the authority to do 
so, and shaped by the scientific paradigms 
of the period. Although science is socially 
embedded, its culture is not as flexible, 
indeterminate, and relativistic as that of 
law and politics. Science is committed to 
a conception of truth reached through a 
conventional methodology of proof based 
on the testing of falsifiable propositions. 
Scientists subscribe to rigorous standards 
of empirical observation and proof. Prin-
ciples of peer review enforce a norm of 
extreme caution.
Law Unlike science, legal principles 
are rooted in propositions about how 
things should be, not how the world 
actually works. Law seeks legitimacy by 
generating outcomes that are perceived as 
just and morally correct by the general 
public, not just the experts. Law oper-
ates under pressure to resolve disputes 
quickly and conclusively, and its findings 
are treated as final and authoritative. 
Science, in contrast, seeks to develop a 
professional consensus on the truth of its 
propositions. This often takes a long time, 
and even then it can be open to revision. 
Yet the law’s demand for immediate 
and conclusive dispute resolution may 
force legal decision makers to choose 
prematurely among competing scientific 
theories. 
Politics Important process values 
include participation, accountability, 
and conflict management. Politicians 
are driven by the need to build and 
maintain a winning electoral coalition. 
Political decisions tend to be “spasmodic 
and impulsive.” The preferred decision 
technique is bargaining to a consensus, a 
process that is complex and continuous. 
Compromise of principle is inevitable. 
Political culture embraces many populist 
premises that science and (to a lesser 
degree) law repudiate. 
Science, politics, and law commonly 
converge at their peripheries in the 
context of a multicultural issue. This 
demands a complex decision-making 
structure that can somehow integrate the 
conflicting values. Society must negoti-
ate the relative weights of the conflicting 
values in an ad hoc fashion; this is messy 
and indeterminate, but it is a condition of 
liberal-democratic-technocratic society 
that we simply must learn to live with and 
manage better. Schuck (1993) argues that 
the culture with the ultimate decision-
making authority in any given situation 
should infuse into its decision process the 
relevant values of the other cultures. 
Condlin (1999) observed a group 
of lawyers and scientists discussing a 
complicated interdisciplinary problem 
to study cultural tensions and communi-
cation problems. He found that lawyers 
converse in ways that are difficult for 
scientists to understand, thereby exac-
erbating the natural cultural tension be-
tween law and science. Condlin, himself 
a law professor, scathingly described the 
lawyers as “seemingly driven by a kind 
of disciplinary imperialism,” looking 
at the issue solely from an insular and 
legalistic worldview which the scientists 
must adopt for communication to occur. 
They were combative, with a propensity 
to filibuster and unilaterally control the 
discussion. They expressed their views in 
an overstated and authoritarian manner. 
Condlin (1999) concluded that lawyers 
need to improve their conversational 
techniques and adopt a richer, multifac-
eted concept of their professional role 
outside the courtroom. 
Antypas and Meidinger17 synthesized 
scholarship on science-intensive policy 
disputes, drawing on literature from po-
litical science, sociology, and knowledge 
utilization regarding how such disputes 
occur, who is involved, and approaches 
for handling problems. They argued that 
because science is systematically applied 
to many policy arenas, it has become 
indispensable to social institutions. Yet 
because society imbues science with 
multiple, sometimes ambiguous, mean-
ings, science-policy disputes “do not 
occur in a neutral social field.” Topics 
include knowledge limitations, hidden 
values and conflicts, institutional cul-
tures, societal views of science, science 
and advocacy, and sociology of science, 
among others. 
Sociology of Science
The theory of sociology of science 
holds that “facts” are not purely objec-
17 Antypas, A., and E. Meidinger. Science-inten-
sive policy disputes: an analytic overview of 
the literature. May 1996. Unpublished report. 
Available at http://www.law.buffalo.edu/homep-
age/eemeid/scholarship/scipol.html (accessed 7 
May 2004). 
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tive observations; rather, they achieve the 
status of fact only if produced according 
to socially derived agreements about the 
rightness of particular theories, meth-
ods, techniques, and review processes 
(Jasanoff, 1982; 1990; 1992; 1995). Per-
ceptions of scientific “reality” are colored 
by contextual features such as scientists’ 
professional, institutional, political, and 
cultural affiliations. Scientific claims are 
always contingent on factors such as the 
experimental or interpretative conven-
tions that scientists have agreed to. The 
dominant scientific paradigm strongly 
influences how research questions are 
posed and shapes expectations as to the 
results. When disputes erupt, parties at-
tempt to discredit each other’s claims by 
assaulting these underlying contingen-
cies and labeling the science as “junk.” 
Scientists preserve their authority to set 
this agenda by engaging in “boundary 
work”—defining who has the prestige 
and authority to certify scientific results 
as legitimate. 
These concepts do not apply solely 
to scientists. Jasanoff (1992) argues that 
courts should familiarize themselves with 
sociology of science in order to “dispel 
unrealistic and overly romanticized 
views” of the court’s ability to reveal 
“truth.” She argues that sociology of sci-
ence offers a principled basis for evaluat-
ing legal rules of evidence and provides 
a more complete account of what really 
takes place when courts engage in scien-
tific factfinding. 
Jasanoff (1995) focuses on the role 
of courts in the development of what 
becomes accepted as scientific, technical, 
and medical knowledge. She acknowl-
edges the science-law culture clash, 
but suggests that science and law also 
complement each other’s shaping of sci-
entific research and knowledge. She also 
argues that courts have played a positive 
role in democratizing science by forcing 
experts to explain their findings in terms 
understandable to laypersons. “Good sci-
ence” alone cannot solve problems at the 
junction of law, science, and technology 
because science is not free from moral 
and policy choices. She examines the 
intersection of science, technology, and 
law in the legal system’s construction of 
scientific knowledge and its management 
of technological change, using examples 
from case law to illustrate how courts 
construct their own version of scientific 
“truth.” 
Caudill (1999) discusses “science 
wars,” the debate about the scope and au-
thority of science in the legal arena. Crit-
ics of science emphasize its historical, 
social, rhetorical, political, moral, and 
gendered aspects, while defenders of sci-
ence emphasize its linear and progressive 
nature, based on testable and falsifiable 
hypotheses. Caudill asks, “what is the ap-
propriate response from lawyers, judges, 
legislators, and legal scholars?” One 
option is to simply ignore the critique of 
science and its institutions as too radi-
cal. If so, the law will reflect traditional 
notions of science as the arbiter of truth 
about reality. At the other extreme lies 
full-scale adoption of the social construc-
tivist view of science. But law requires 
science to produce reliable knowledge 
about the natural world. 
A third option was fashioned by the 
United States Supreme Court in the 
landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).18 This ap-
proach upholds the importance of sound 
scientific methodology as it appears in 
scientific journals, but also encourages 
flexibility among gatekeeper judges by 
sometimes permitting unpublished 
theories which are well-grounded and 
innovative. Unfortunately, judges who 
naively idealize science may assume that 
if two experts disagree, one of them must 
be using “junk science.” A more sophisti-
cated view acknowledges the court’s need 
to resolve the dispute at hand, while ac-
cepting that future revisions in scientific 
understanding are an essential aspect of 
the scientific method. 
Radical critics of science have charged 
that scientifically derived “facts” are no 
better than opinion or conjecture in rep-
resenting an objective “truth” (Caudill, 
1999). This perspective seems extreme 
(because it ignores science’s commit-
ment to empirical data) and impractical 
(because even contingent science is su-
perior to raw conjecture and superstitious 
18 See Jasanoff (1995) for a detailed analysis of 
this case and its impact on admissibility of scien-
tific evidence in the courtroom. 
belief). Nevertheless, when seen from a 
moderate perspective, sociology of sci-
ence should be considered as a useful 
and valid theoretical lens for examining 
unspoken assumptions that may exert 
a powerful influence in the decision-
making process.
Social Psychology and Law
This area of inquiry is a fascinating 
rising star in the field of interdisciplinary 
legal commentary. Blumenthal (2002) 
characterizes the use of social science, 
and psychology in particular, to inform 
legal theory and practice as “fast becom-
ing the latest craze in the pages of legal 
academia.” 
Fishery managers and scientists are 
often confronted with the challenge of 
influencing stakeholder beliefs in an 
atmosphere of high uncertainty. Fox and 
Irwin (1998) advance a framework for 
organizing the six sources of informa-
tion on which listeners rely when up-
dating their beliefs under conditions of 
uncertainty: 1) the listener’s prior beliefs 
and assumptions, 2) the listener’s inter-
pretation of the social and informational 
context in which the speaker’s beliefs 
were formed, 3) the listener’s evalu-
ation of the speaker’s credibility and 
judgmental tendencies, 4) the listener’s 
interpretation of the social and motiva-
tional context in which the statement 
was made, 5) the listener’s understand-
ing of information conveyed directly 
and indirectly by the speaker, and 6) 
the listener’s interpretation of the social 
context in which the statement was em-
bedded. This study suggests that it may 
be useful to examine whether norms of 
scientific communication come across 
as unpersuasive from a legal perspective. 
For example, judges are accustomed to 
legal modes of discourse, which empha-
size certainty and persuasiveness. In this 
light, the language used by scientists in 
environmental documents might seem 
weak, uncertain, and consequently 
unpersuasive.
Langevoort (1998) performed a 
comprehensive literature review apply-
ing behavioral psychology to law. He 
focused on the cognitive psychology 
literature on decision-making biases 
(i.e. the tendency to make judgments and 
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decisions departing from economists’ 
rational choice model). For example, the 
tendency to weigh losses more heavily 
than gains leads people to frame deci-
sions in terms of potential wins/losses. 
This literature can be helpful for ex-
plaining agency behavior. Langevoort 
shows how new behavioral decision-
making research is being applied by 
legal scholars.
Very few scholars have applied these 
ideas to the fisheries management arena; 
more work in this area is needed. One no-
table exception is provided by Thompson 
(2000), who applies empirical social psy-
chology research to examine why dilem-
mas like “the tragedy of the commons” 
are so difficult to solve, and why it is so 
difficult for resource users to confront 
resource problems rationally. 
First, resource users must reduce 
their current level of consumption in 
order to preserve the resource for future 
use. However, people tend to view this 
trade-off as giving up a current right, 
and social psychology research shows 
that most people are willing to risk 
huge future potential losses in order 
to avoid the certain, immediate loss 
incurred by temporarily restricting their 
current level of resource use. People 
tend to be overly optimistic about the 
future, believing that they will be able 
to avoid or ameliorate future risks. 
Second, in conditions of high scientific 
uncertainty, people faced with tough 
choices “engage in tremendous wishful 
thinking,” overestimating the abundance 
of the resource and underestimating the 
threats. Third, in formulating rules for 
spreading the regulatory burden around, 
people egocentrically believe that the 
fairest rule is the one that benefits them 
the most. Thompson suggests ways 
to counter these problems, such as re-
ducing uncertainty, reducing temporal 
discounting, focusing on present costs, 
finding acceptable solutions, and engag-
ing in discussions about fairly allocating 
the burdens.
The Professional Role of  
Scientists in a Regulatory Agency
Scientists at regulatory agencies face 
a special set of professional challenges. 
Their research must be relevant to press-
ing policy questions and legal require-
ments. Their work is subject to strict legal 
time constraints. They are held account-
able to Congress, courts, and the public 
as well as to their peers. Moreover, they 
must work within agency “culture”—in-
stitutionalized rules, rituals, and values 
a group produces to confront common 
problems (Vaughan, 1996)—which may 
carry its own political pressures. Thus, 
the role of agency culture deserves a 
closer look as a potential aspect of the 
litigation situation. 
An ongoing topic of debate is the 
extent to which scientists should be segre-
gated from decision makers in the policy 
process. It is commonly assumed that 
strict separation is essential to ensure that 
the scientists are not unduly influenced 
by political pressure from the decision 
makers. But many commentators argue 
that science advocacy is not necessar-
ily inappropriate. Like Jasanoff (1990), 
Shannon et al. (1996) argue that the strict 
separation of science from administration 
is not the panacea it may appear to be.
Regulatory science intrinsically in-
volves policy and values, and it is un-
desirable to pretend otherwise. Applied 
science does not just produce a “bucket 
of facts”; rather it has the potential to 
transform how society interacts with 
natural resources. Integrating scientists 
into the management process allows 
them to study the application of scientifi-
cally-based management approaches and 
provide the necessary critique of man-
agement. Furthermore, “managers gain 
the creativity of scientists in developing 
new solutions to complex problems and 
profit from the culture of critique and in-
quiry distinctive to scientists” (Shannon 
et. al., 1996). They advocate discussions 
among scientists, decision makers, and 
the public on what kinds of science ad-
vocacy are appropriate, and under what 
conditions. 
Similarly, Clark et al. (2002) argue 
that conservation biologists should learn 
and apply “policy orientation,” which 
encourages the integration of biological 
and social sciences to help managers, 
leaders, and the public make sound 
choices and solve problems effectively. A 
policy orientation can complement rigor-
ous scientific methods and help achieve 
conservation goals without sacrificing 
scientific professionalism. Conservation 
biologists need to understand the policy 
process well enough to maximize op-
portunities for applying science-based 
recommendations. They must walk the 
narrow line between science and poli-
cymaking, addressing concerns raised 
by both. They must produce (or at least 
support) reliable research and participate 
in the socio-political context where that 
information is used. They should develop 
a useful “map” of the policy process and 
subsequently learn how to influence the 
process. 
Mills and Clark (2001) argue that re-
search scientists can and should contrib-
ute to natural resource management for-
mulation; however, because working in 
the science-policy interface is inherently 
political, they must be very careful not to 
jeopardize their scientific independence. 
Some suggestions for accomplishing 
this difficult task include: understanding 
the political environment, learning how 
to translate management questions into 
science questions, clarifying uncertainty 
and risk, maintaining rigorous quality 
control, and refraining from advocating 
a particular policy outcome. They argue 
that science can be value-neutral and can 
help focus discussion on choices and con-
sequences, thus increasing the likelihood 
of management success. 
Lach et al. (2003) surveyed scientists 
and nonscientists, asking whether scien-
tists should act as policy advocates and, 
if so, in what way. Most nonscientist 
respondents preferred scientists to “work 
closely with managers and others in inte-
grating scientific results into management 
decisions.” Scientists, while supportive of 
this role, preferred scientists to “report 
and interpret scientific results for others 
who are involved in natural resource 
science.” There was much less support 
for allowing scientists to advocate for or 
make specific decisions. Many scientists 
expressed concern that their credibility 
would suffer if they became more in-
volved in decision making. There were 
also different preferences for the way 
scientists should communicate informa-
tion. Scientists preferred to communicate 
directly within the scientific community 
or the agency. Managers emphasized 
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communication to themselves and the 
public through on-site demonstrations, 
but preferred to transmit and interpret 
the information to the public themselves. 
Lach et al. (2003) concluded that most 
scientists would support a more activist, 
integrative role in resource management, 
but that they would have to communicate 
more effectively with managers and non-
scientist groups to effectively integrate 
scientific information in the decision 
process. 
Wallace (2003) analyzed the decision-
making behavior of agency personnel in 
five marine mammal recovery programs 
to discover what factors participants 
believe affect their recovery programs 
and how these factors influence decision 
making. He found that decision-making 
and participant interactions are strongly 
influenced by social factors such as 
leadership characteristics, communica-
tion, teamwork, the presence or absence 
of evaluation, and the development of 
prototype programs that incorporate and 
apply social factors to problem solving. 
Throughout the policy process, social 
behavior was influenced by the partici-
pants’ values (power, wealth, knowledge, 
skill, respect, affection, well-being, and 
rectitude). If they could maintain or 
increase desired values while promot-
ing species recovery, they did so; if not, 
species recovery suffered. Improved 
communication between agency leaders 
and staff members might reduce discord 
but is not likely to overcome the effects 
of political pressure. He argued that 
agency leaders should shun defensive 
decision-making strategies, focusing on 
species recovery. They need to recognize 
and support staff that provide data-based 
and problem oriented decision choices; 
these people are sometimes ignored or 
even reprimanded. 
Mattson (1996) sees multiple barri-
ers to the ethical practice of regulatory 
science. Applied research is designed to 
generate information directly relevant 
to resource decisions, which places 
political pressure on agencies and may 
make scientists partly responsible for 
management decisions. Researchers 
may become subsumed in management 
culture, which values cooperation, obe-
dience, loyalty, and being a team player. 
Agency scientists may feel pressure when 
research results are at odds with prevail-
ing political and social forces. And access 
to the research problem is controlled by 
the agency. Although most agency sci-
entists do not behave unethically, these 
circumstances may make transgressions 
more likely. Mattson (1996) argued that 
ethical behavior can be promoted through 
institutional measures that affect per-
sonal incentives. These include keeping 
agency scientists in a separate adminis-
trative branch, alleviating monopolistic 
research arrangements, deemphasizing 
the importance of conformity, and using 
professional science organizations as 
mediators. 
Suggestions for Future Research
Several key themes were repeated 
throughout this literature review. In-
terestingly, many of them run counter 
to conventional wisdom. Chief among 
them is the idea that more and better 
science does not automatically improve 
resource management and policy. The 
“science charade” is a consequence of 
inadvertent or deliberate attempts to 
pretend that trans-scientific problems 
can be solved by science alone, exacer-
bated by Congress’s penchant for using 
broad, vague language to delegate thorny 
resource management policy decisions 
to agencies. Moreover, the complex net-
work of laws governing marine resource 
management may sometimes hinder at-
tempts to practice adaptive management 
or ecosystem management. 
Many commentators find it instruc-
tive to examine the differing cultures 
and socially constructed aspects of law 
and science as a means of getting at 
pervasive, unstated assumptions that 
hamper communication. These themes 
suggest the following potential research 
questions that deserve closer scrutiny 
in an effort to shed light on the role of 
NMFS scientists and managers in the 
process of helping the agency meet its 
legal requirements.
1) A recent litigation review (NAPA, 
2002) suggests that NMFS actually wins 
most science-based challenges, but its 
losses are often because it fails to pro-
vide a rational connection between the 
evidence in the administrative record and 
the action. Given that courts will defer to 
the agency’s decision if it is adequately 
explained, why does NMFS fail to pro-
vide sufficient reasoning to support its 
decisions? This will require a deeper 
look at institutional factors governing sci-
ence-policy integration at NMFS. What 
is the role of the “science charade”? Can 
scientists participate more actively in the 
management process without straying 
from the central values of their profes-
sion, and if so, how? 
2) There is very little legal guidance on 
the proper depth and breadth of a PEIS, as 
well as how to tier site-specific analyses 
to the broad programmatic document. 
A recent CEQ study (2003) indicated 
that NEPA practitioners and affected 
stakeholders could benefit from a better 
understanding of how to do a program-
matic analysis. It would be useful to 
review this issue in the fishery manage-
ment context and to consider whether 
guidance is needed. 
3) A focused, updated litigation analy-
sis may be helpful. While the NAPA 
litigation analysis summarized recent 
cases and revealed general trends, more 
could be done. For example, the NAPA 
(2002) recommendations to NMFS 
tended to simply restate legal standards19 
and as such are not especially helpful in 
crafting strategies for courtroom success. 
What lessons can NMFS learn from the 
experience of other agencies such as the 
Forest Service and the EPA, which have 
extensive experience dealing with litiga-
tion crunches?
4) It may be useful to take a closer look 
at how emerging ecological theories clash 
with environmental laws. Current efforts 
to deal with this problem are focused 
on ways to introduce new ideas into the 
structure of existing laws, but there may 
be other ways to do this. For example, 
NEPA’s requirement to assess cumula-
tive impacts presents an opportunity 
to incorporate ecosystem management 
ideas into the environmental impact as-
sessment process.
19 NAPA recommended that “appropriate alterna-
tives must be studied, developed, and described 
when preparing EA’s and EIS’s” and “threatened 
and endangered species must be listed under the 
appropriate legal standards.” 
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5) The Steller sea lion dispute presents 
an excellent opportunity for a case study 
of resource management under high sci-
entific uncertainty and legal complexity, 
focusing on the legal, institutional, and 
scientific factors that hampered efforts 
to reach consensus. 
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